Towards a New Paradigm for Social Science Research Towards a New Paradigm for Social Science Research
“Towards a New Paradigm for Social Science Research”
by
Ibrahim A. Ragab, Ph.D.
Professor, Department of Sociology and Anthropology
International Islamic University Malaysia
__________________________________
Paper originally submitted to the Fourth International Social Science Methodology
Conference , at the University of Essex, Colchester, UK , 1-5 July 1996.
[Keywords : New Paradigm Research - Social Science Research –
positivist/ empiricist perspective – Post-positivism – Pitrim Sorokin -
Ibrahim Ragab]
TOWARDS A NEW PARADIGM
FOR SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH
I. INTRODUCTION
When I first came across a statement to the effect that it normally
takes the social sciences fifty years to digest and assimilate any new
development in the physical sciences, I took that for some kind of
exaggeration. With the modern explosion in communications, the
statement seemed too pessimistic to be applicable to the world of
today. Not until I came to consider the fate -in the social sciences- of
the magnificent developments which have been taking place in the
natural sciences since the early decades of this century. These great
scientific discoveries, the impact of which is forcing a deep rethinking
of science itself , thus leading to the emergence of the “new
philosophy of science”, have hardly made a dent on the social
sciences . What is especially deplorable about this is that these
particular developments in the natural sciences should have been of
great interest because of their special relevance for the social
sciences. They indeed seem to be ushering in a brave new
understanding of the nature of matter, human being, and mind. But
most social scientists hold a too deep-seated belief in the positivist/
empiricist tradition’s conception of what should constitute “true”
science to allow them to harbor any serious doubts about its validity.
For them, it is “the only” perspective from which to see and to
understand the world. For them, it looks so unscientific, or almost
heretical to think otherwise. This recalcitrance, understandably
incensed the critics of positivism, who became more defiant and
more virulent in their criticism. Since extreme positions - by definition -
tend to distort the truth, the critics’ suggestions to remedy the
situation turned out to be the less palatable - even to those who may
basically accept the arguments against positivism. Which, in turn,
seems to have resulted in an impasse.
Some of those critics, who came to be known as the post-
positivists or post-empiricists, seem to have to resort to extremes to
be able to shake the faith-like convictions of the hard-core empiricists.
Moreover, to be convincing, the critics were less interested in coming
up with what could look like viable alternatives as much as to live up to
their extreme criticism of positivism - at the cost of becoming even
less convincing. Many scholars considered to be themselves among
the post-positivists could hardly accept such extreme alternatives.
The whole situation, then, seems to call for a more balanced
approach to both aspects of the issue : the critique of the dominant
paradigm on the one hand, and the proposed alternatives on the
other.
The position adopted throughout this paper is that the crucial, well-
founded objections leveled against the positivist/ empiricist tradition
should never blind us not to see what is still valid and valuable in that
tradition, specifically when it comes to the study of the empirical
aspects of reality. It would only be self-defeating to deny that even
human and social phenomena have their empirical aspects that lend
themselves readily to observation through sense experience. But
sense experiences and observation from outside definitely do not tell
the whole story of human behavior. The basic problem with positivism
(in its purist forms), it seems, does not lie as much with its inherent
invalidity as it is in its exclusivity, that is, its uncompromising
insistence that sense experience is “exclusively” the one and only
legitimate source for all “scientific” knowledge (while grudgingly
accepting a limited role for reason in its logical-positivist variety).
What is regrettable in this connection, is that such assumption
(amounting to a “belief”) is not based on any particularly “scientific”,
empirically validated, or even logical considerations, but it is -
strangely enough - based on historical/ political contingencies, as will
be shown below. It is then only reasonable to suggest that any
successful re-vision of the current epistemological scene should first
tackle and then transcend the effects of these historical/ political
factors.
The crisis - as some insist when characterizing the situation - in
social science scholarship in general, and at the methodological front
in particular, is reflected in the following tripartite problematic situation:
(1) The Critique: where we have those waging dire attacks on the
positivist/ empiricist tradition, attacks that at times deny any claims to
truth for that perspective, which renders those claims ineffective.
(2) The Alternatives: where we encounter unconvincing extreme
alternatives to positivism, suggested by the same critics, which result
in more renitence on the part of the positivists.
(3) The Context: where we note inability of both parties to
appreciate, and then to effectively transcend the historical/ political
roots of the debate.
It could be added at once that Immoderation and immodesty
complicate the whole situation, for these are indeed the nemeses of
effective exchange among otherwise very thoughtful scholars.
The purpose of this paper is to elaborate, in a systematic fashion, on
the issues alluded to above, with the intention to hopefully providing
some perspective on their problematics - as far as is possible at this
point in time. To do justice to all three aspects of the debate, it might
be appropriate to start our discussion with a clear statement of the
positivist/ empiricist position before embarking on an analysis of its
historical and intellectual roots. This should set the stage for a
rigorous critique of empiricism, especially in its rugged forms. On the
basis of that analysis a new synthesis is suggested here, which it is
hoped, would be adequate to addressing the valid criticisms made
against empiricism, while attempting to rectify the blatant omissions of
the old paradigm. But it should be asserted from the start that this
task could never be achieved except after exorcising ourselves first
of those historical demons that we alluded to earlier… which may
mean as Pitrim Sorokin (1941) would suggest, nothing less than a
major transformation in our current value configuration. The
suggested alternative may sound a bit radical for those who are still
caught into the “orthodox consensus”, to use Giddens’ phraseology
(1982). However, this seems to be exactly what is needed for us to
be able to free ourselves from the bondage of the familiar, and to
help us respond to the situation in fresh, vigorous and unhesitant
ways.
II. THE SCIENTIFIC METHOD AND THE POSITIVIST/EMPIRICIST
LEGACY
Although it may be very hard to believe by many, contemporary
reevaluations of the history of science have shown that the "idea of
science... [as we know it today] is only one of many, and that it is a
product of temporary circumstances" [emphasis added] (Ravetz,
1975: 366). Historians of science, according to Ravetz, are also
coming to view present conceptions of science as "one phase in a
continuing evolution, and that modern science as we know it is an
integral part of European civilization (and Western way of life),
reflecting "its faults as well as its virtues" (p.375). In the same vein,
Johan Galtung (1977) writes that any discussion of scientific
methodology "without reference to the underlying social structure is
misleading. That kind of discussion will only lead to pretenses of
universalism and absolutism..." (p.13). Tudor (1982) completes the
demystification process by stating that "science is a social activity like
any other and thus subject to similar ‘irrational’ constraints and
virtues". (p.31). So, far from being the safe, unbiased, and immutable
process we think it is, the scientific method has been shaped through
its development by such mundane things as culture, ideology,
politics, self interest , and even long-standing hatreds and
animosities. These and similar eye-opening insights should prove to
us how fallible we all are, and that we cannot grant, even to science,
the kind of blind respect and trust that only religion did one day
muster, and which science, incidentally, has valiantly fought to
dispossess religion of! Bergin (1980) sums up the situation
beautifully when he states that: "Science has lost its authority as the
dominating source of truth it once was. This change is both reflected
in and stimulated by analyses that reveal science to be an intuitive
and value-laden cultural form.. Although a belief in the value of the
scientific method appropriately persists, there is a widespread
disillusionment with the way it has been used and a loss of faith in it
as the cure for human ills" (p.95).
Thus we do indeed have, not only a moral, but in fact a "scientific"
obligation and responsibility to closely examine our conceptions of
the scientific method to see where did we err, particularly in our
efforts at the “scientific” study of human beings. This takes us directly
to the positivist/ empiricist legacy. The Modern Dictionary of
Sociology defines positivism as "the philosophical position holding
that knowledge can be derived only from sensory experience"
(Theodorson and Theodorson 1969:306). A variant of positivism,
"logical positivism", only concedes that "logical analysis is needed to
clarify meanings that have been verified or falsified through sense
experience, but such analyses should be closely associated with
empirical observation..." (p.307). Logical positivists at the same time
condemn "..as nonsense ...all moral, aesthetic, and metaphysical
assertions". (Feigl, 1975: 879). "Logical empiricism", a modified
version of the above, developed in the mid third of this century,
relinquished the designation "positivism" altogether because of the
negative attitude it carries toward the existence of any "theoretical"
entities. "Empiricism" is, however, retained as it insists on "the
requirement that hypotheses and theories be empirically testable"
(p.881). Logical empiricism, which is the dominant philosophy
guiding scientific inquiry today, also insists that "all statements
about moral ...or religious values are scientifically unverifiable and
meaningless" (Levi, 1975: 273).
But how can we explain the messianic zeal with which the
empiricists defend the use of the senses as the only source of
acceptable "scientific" knowledge? And why that vehement
insistence on the summary exclusion of all other sources of
knowledge such as religious concepts assumed to be ‘revealed’
knowledge? It would have been interesting to try here to trace the
historical development of science and the scientific method to be in a
position to give detailed answers to these two questions. That,
however, goes beyond the scope of this paper. Fortunately, there
exists a vast literature on the subject, to which the reader may be
referred (see e.g. Sarton, 1975; Levi, 1975; Ravetz, 1975).
Suffice it at this point to conclude with Polkinghorne (1984) that:
"In Western philosophy, there has been an ongoing search for a
foundation or ground upon which to secure true knowledge. After
scriptural authority and Descartes' clear and undoubtable ideas...were
found wanting, there was a general acceptance of sense
experience as the base for certainty". (p.418) [emphasis added].
It is widely acknowledged today that the emergence of that warped
positivist/ empiricist tradition, with its single-minded emphasis on
sense experiences was only the bitter harvest of the unfortunate
conflict between the church and the nascent scientific community
during the Renaissance. As a consequence, scientists resolutely
determined to break loose from church authority at any price, went so
far - it seems - as to throw the baby with the bath water. But this calls
for elaboration.
We are told by historians of science that "Western philosophy in
the Middle Ages was primarily a Christian philosophy, clarifying the
divine revelation...[but] the Renaissance mounted its revolt against the
reign of religion and therefore reacted against the church, against
authority, against Scholasticism, and against Aristotle." (Levi, 1975:
261). Toulmin (1975) adds that "Francis Bacon, author of the method
of exhaustive induction ...reacted against the Scholastic reliance on
Aristotle's authority by calling for a return to firsthand
experience ...was preoccupied with empirically observed facts
as the starting point for all science..." [emphasis added] (p.378)
To clear away from Aristotle, whose ideas were adopted as official
doctrine by the church, an independent source for gaining true
knowledge had to be found and to be consecrated! Sense
experience, the capacity for which is owned by everybody and not
monopolized by the clergy was the most fitting answer. This was
indeed a reasonable foundation on which to base our search for the
truth. However, to free science -forever- from the grip of the church or
from any other arbitrary authority for that matter, sense experiences
were to be regarded as the "sole source" of scientific knowledge.
This was meant to completely and irrevocably exclude revelation -
true or false - from playing any role whatsoever anywhere in the whole
brave new scientific enterprise.
This ideology served its purposes very well as it guided physical
scientists engaged in the study of natural, material phenomena. The
subject matter under study, by its nature, was amenable to objective
observation from outside through the use of the senses and through
equipment designed to extend their reach. The validity of verification
of the findings was guaranteed through replication of experiments,
done on inanimate matter or non-human organisms. Certainty
seemed to be easily within our reach, or so it appeared - up to a point.
This of course, explains the exemplary success of the "traditional"
scientific method in the study of natural phenomena.
Hoping to achieve a comparable degree of success in the study
of humans, scientists (or rather philosophers at that point in time)
enthusiastically called for the application of the same methods used
in the natural sciences to the realm of the social sciences. But this
was not the only motive behind the call for emulating the physical
sciences - as should be clear from the historical account above.
Scientists were also keen to seal out any influence the church may
still claim on the "scientific" study of human being in particular,
because understanding and guiding human affairs was exactly the
bone of contention between scientists and religious authorities. This
is where Auguste Compte's call for positivism could be understood,
with its insistence that "The methods of physical sciences are
regarded as the only accurate means of obtaining knowledge, and
therefore the social sciences should be limited to the use of these
methods and modeled after the physical sciences". (Theodorson &
Theodorson, 1969: 306).This should also explain the wide
acceptance of positivist ideas among social scientists and beyond.
Feigl (1975) points out the anti-church motive behind this call when he
stated that "In its basic ideological posture, positivism is thus worldly,
secular, anti-theological, and anti-metaphysical" (p.877). But what did
all that mean for the social sciences and their research methods?
How did nineteenth century views of the world and of the methods of
knowing about the world held by the physical scientists affect the
study of human being, then and until the dawn of the twenty-first
century?
III.THE POSITIVIST/ EMPIRICIST IMPACT ON THE SOCIAL
SCIENCES
IN 1843 John Stuart Mill wrote that "The backward state of the
moral [human] sciences can be remedied by applying to them the
methods of physical science, duly extended and generalized."
(Polkinghorne, 1984: 416). The first part of this advice was religiously
followed by social scientists since then. The consequences of
emulating the physical sciences were dire indeed. To appreciate the
extent of the damage done as a result of the indiscriminate use of
these same methods in the study of humans, let us examine the
characteristics of the version of science and the scientific method
which were applied in the physical sciences at that time and which still
drag on up to this day. Authorities on the subject would tell us that
nineteenth century science could generally be described as
materialistic, mechanistic, and reductionist, reflecting conceptions of
reality prevalent in that era (Sorokin,1941; Augros and Stanciu, 1984).
In physics, Newton's formulations have since the seventeenth
century been successfully applied to explain much of the physical
world on the basis of the existence of "matter" alone. As a result,
scientists came to view "materialism" as part and parcel of the
scientific method itself (Augros & Stanciu, 1984). This was,
according to Capra (1982), coupled with a "mechanical" view of the
cosmos. He states that "For two and a half centuries physicists have
used a mechanistic view of the world to develop and refine ..classical
physics ..Matter was thought to be the basis of all existence, and the
material world was seen as a multitude of objects assembled into a
huge machine ...[that] consist of elementary parts... complex
phenomena could be always understood by reducing them to their
building blocks and by looking for the mechanisms through which
these interacted. This attitude, known as reductionism, ... has often
been identified with the scientific method." (31-32).
Unfortunately, human beings came to be understood and to be
studied within the same mechanical, reductionist, and materialist
mentality. Research methods and research designs reflecting these
same ontological and epistemological assumptions were used (Ford,
1984). All this was done without serious reflection on how the subject
matter of the social sciences differed in very significant ways from
that of the physical sciences. This type of confusing two very different
phenomena and treating them alike is sometimes called a "category
error" or a "category mistake" (Weick, 1987:222). The effects were
debilitating indeed. We do not need to go to great lengths
documenting the failure of the behavioral and social sciences in their
efforts to understand human beings and to account for their behavior.
This is well documented and all too familiar. And many critics are
even coming to see the connection between these failures on the one
hand and the that outdated mode of viewing the world and
conceptualizing science which still dominate the social sciences even
today.
Critics of psychological research and practice for example, are
coming to say in different words something like the following.
"Psychology has an identity problem. After more than a century of
official existence...there is even debate of our subject matter.. Staats
and Kosh agree that psychology's splintered condition results, at
least in part, and probably most importantly, from the existence of
sharply polarized opinion about the epistemological
underpinnings of psychology". (Kimble, 1984:833 [Italics
added]). Similar assessments of the situation in psychology abound.
(Howard, 1985; Augros & Stanciu, 1984; Bergin, 1980;
Polkinghorne,1984).
The same applies to sociology (e.g. Dixon, 1973;
Gouldner,1970). Walter Wallace had to complain that “The appalling
fact.. is that even now, after decades of research and teaching,
virtually none of the key substantive terms in sociology has acquired
an explicitly standard meaning to any large majority of sociologists…
scientifically speaking, we sociologists simply do not know (and may
not care) what we are talking about” [Italics his].(1988: 23-24). He
goes on to quote other prominent sociologists such as Wiley, Collins,
Alexander, and Gans, who lament what they see as a “theoretical
lull” in sociology…, or a “rather widespread feeling that sociology in
recent years has been in a depression … [and] the feeling that our
work is going nowhere”(: 59). But Wallace, the self-admitted
naturalist, had to find some way to explain out the malaise so that
naturalism could come out unscathed. The explanation has to come
still from within the parameters of the normal paradigm. He thus
concludes that this disciplinary condition is only temporary, implying
that more of the same would do the trick - but all it takes (for him) is to
follow the theoretical mapping he provides!. Echoes of the above
could be also heard in the other social sciences. (Moten, 1990). In
social work, a heated debate has been going on for a decade to the
same effect. (see references to such works in, Peile, 1988).
Many critics are increasingly coming to see that the major problem
with the social sciences find their roots in the fact that human beings
are different in many ways from things, machines or other living
organisms. This fact should, by necessity, require corresponding
modifications in the theoretical models and research methods used
to study human beings. Howard (1985) puts it this way: "...if humans
possess characteristics that are unlike the characteristics of subject
matter studied by other sciences, then an appropriate science of
human behavior might need to be somewhat different from other
extant sciences". (p.p.259-260). Polkinghorne (1984) goes one step
further, identifying five areas in which the "human realm" is different,
and suggesting the appropriate research stance corresponding to
each. The human realm is different in terms of : a) its systemic
character; hence, contextual relations are more important than those
among parts. b) its unclear boundaries is the rule not the exception;
hence, the inappropriate-ness of deductive-numeric operations. c)
unfinished quality; the human realm is in flux, and has a history;
hence, correlations between elements may hold at one time but not at
another. d) composition, knowing humans is a "human" activity;
hence, there is no absolute point outside ourselves from which to
investigate. e) difficulty of access, the human realm is not directly
observable from the outside, is saturated with meaning, hence, we
have to accept evidence which is different nature than observation.
Another theme that runs through criticisms of a social science
bent on following on the footsteps of the natural sciences is that of
the total exclusion of the "spiritual" or religious dimensions of the
human being. Bergin (1980) for example reports that "an examination
of 30 introductory psychology texts turned up no references to the
possible reality of spiritual factors. Most did not have the words God
or religion in their indexes". He further quotes the psychologist
Robert Hogan as saying "Religion is the most important social force
in the history of man...But in psychology, anyone who...tries to talk in
an analytic, careful way about religion is immediately branded a
meathead; a mystic; an intuitive...sort of moron" (p.99).
Roger Sperry , on the basis of his vast research on split-brain (for
which he was awarded the Nobel Prize in 1982) talks about a
"theoretical turnabout" in psychology. He describes the emerging
"new view of reality" as one that "...accepts mental and spiritual
qualities as causal realities...Instead of excluding mind and spirit, the
new outlook puts subjective mental forces near the top of the brains'
s causal control hierarchy and gives them primacy in determining what
a person does" (1988: 608-609). But how did this turnabout come
through? Was it the result of some literal "soul" searching on the part
of behavioral and social scientists who should be experiencing a
theoretical near-breakdown? Far from it! The emerging new
paradigm, to a large extent, was a direct result, instead, of the
revolutionary discoveries in - again - the physical sciences! Classical
physics had first to crumble under the weight of new discoveries in
the first three decades of this century; then to be replaced by the new
paradigm in physics; then social science waits for fifty more years till
the new developments sink in, before it sheepishly reconsiders its
position in the light of the new paradigm in the physical sciences,
again! We are only recently starting to act.
IV.NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN SCIENCE, AND THE NEW
PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
According to Augros & Stanciu (1984), respectively a philosopher
of science and a physicist, science has since the beginning of this
century, undergone a series of exciting revolutions in physics, in
neuroscience, in cosmology, and in psychology. Capra, also a
physicist, in his 1982 monumental work documented these
developments in detail, and followed through with a description of
their societal ramifications and consequences. He states that the
“dramatic changes of concepts and ideas that has occurred in
physics ...in our current theories of matter...[have] brought about a
profound change in our worldview; from the mechanistic...to a holistic
and ecological view...[with] deep insights into the nature of matter and
its relation to the human mind...” (p.p. XVII-XVIII). Space would not
allow a fuller appreciation of his account of the fascinating
developments which shaped modern physics as a result of Albert
Einstein's pioneering work on relativity, and of Niels Bohr and Werner
Heisenberg's work on quantum theory. Capra's work contains a
wealth of detail in that respect. However, because of the centrality of
the subject to our argument, some extensive quoting here may be in
order. Capra tells us that these developments "shattered all the
principal concepts of the Cartesian world view and Newtonian
mechanics. The notion of absolute space and time, the elementary
solid particles, the fundamental material substance, the strictly causal
nature of physical phenomena, and the objective description of nature
- none of these concepts could be extended to the new domains into
which physics was now penetrating"(p.62). One of the most important
consequences of the theory of relativity for example was "the
realization that mass is nothing but a form of energy
...Physicists...measure the masses of particles in the corresponding
energy units...Atoms consist of particles, and these particles are not
made of any material stuff. When we observe them we never see
any substance;...[only] dynamic patterns continually changing into one
another..."(p.p. 81-82).
The new discoveries in atomic and subatomic physics came as a
"great shock" to scientists. Even Einstein reportedly felt as though
"the ground had been pulled out from under [him]". Far from the hard,
solid particles they were supposed to be, “atoms were found to
consist of vast regions of space in which electrons moved around the
nucleus, which in turn is comprised of protons and neutrons. Even
those subatomic particles "were nothing like the solid objects of
classical physics...[they] are very abstract entities which have a dual
aspect. Depending on how we look at them, they appear sometimes
as particles, sometimes as waves...The situation seemed hopelessly
paradoxical until it was realized that the 'particle' and 'wave' refer to
classical concepts which are not fully adequate to describe atomic
phenomena. An electron is neither a particle nor a wave, but it may
show particle-like aspects in some situations and some wave-like
aspects in others". (Capra: 67).Capra comments on these insights by
saying that theories of contemporary science reveal a conception of
the world which can be "in perfect harmony with [the working
scientists'] spiritual aims and religious beliefs". John Polkinghorne
(1986; 1994), yet another physicist, heartily agrees.
New developments in neuroscience and in psychology in the last
twenty years proved to be no less revolutionary than those described
above in physics. Sperry (1988) contrasts these with the old
paradigm. He describes the traditional model in neuroscience and
psychology as proclaiming “a full account of brain function and
behavior to be possible in strictly objective physiochemical and
physiological terms, with no reference to conscious
experience...Things such as moral values, the human spirit, purpose,
dignity, and freedom to choose, if they existed at all, were supposed
to be only epiphenomena..[that] supposedly, in no way changed the
course of events in the real world ...” (p.p. 607-608). He then reports
that the early nineteen seventies brought about, with a remarkable
suddenness, a revolution in the scientific treatment of the relation of
mind and brain. In his words, "The new mentalist thinking brings basic
revisions of causal explanation that provide scientists with a new
philosophy, a new outlook, a new way of understanding and explaining
ourselves and the world. The full range of the contents and qualities
of inner experience...are not only given a new legitimacy in science
but are also given primacy over the more physiochemical forces". (p.
608)
He further elaborates on the causality model on which this
"cognitive", "mentalist", or "humanist" revolution is based. He explains
that "The traditional assumption in neuroscience...implicit in...all the
natural sciences, supposes everything to be determined from below
upward, following the course of evolution. In this materialist
‘microdeterministic’ view of nature, all mental and brain functions are
determined by, and can be explained...[in the last analysis] in terms of
subatomic physics and quantum mechanics...[In contrast] the new
mentalist-cognitive tenets...take into account new, previously
nonexistent, emergent properties, including the mental, that interact
causally at their own higher level, and also exert causal control from
above downward...over their constituent neuronal events - at the same
time that they are determined by them. Microdeterminism is
integrated with emergent determinism". (p.609).
The new paradigm has now been reflected in a "new philosophy of
science", which also seems to be gaining some momentum in the
social sciences. And the movement is manifesting itself in many
different ways. Declarations, for example, are repeatedly made that
the basic assumptions which informed the traditional model of
science are "no longer considered viable". In 1974, Suppe wrote that
"the vast majority of working philosophers of science seem to fall on
that portion of the spectrum which hold the [traditional view of
science] fundamentally inadequate and untenable"(
Polkinghorne:420). A minority of practicing social scientists have for a
long time felt the same way. They have been voicing dissatisfaction
with the experimental model, operationalism, and with the perennial
preoccupation with statistics and numbers. Pitrim Sorokin (1956)
rightfully attacked these tendencies, calling them Quantophrenia and
Testophrenia and had even stronger and more colorful words in his
arsenal.
Another significant manifestation of the dissatisfaction with
positivism in the social sciences is the revolt against the once-
popularized "myth" of value-free sociology. Alvin Gouldner (1973)
strongly attacked the dogma that 'thou shalt not commit a value
judgment', which many sociologists have propagated for long. And
he exposed this myth for what it really is. He puts it this way: "...the
doctrine of a value-free sociology is a modern extension of the
medieval conflict between faith and reason. It grows out of, and still
dwells in, the tendency prevalent since the thirteenth century to erect
compartments between the two as a way of keeping the peace
between them".(p.20). The advocates of value-free social science
may still argue that the doctrine is subscribed to as a guarantee of
the objectivity of the scientist. It saves us from falling victim to our
own biases. But how can we reconcile this with the now very influential
position that "External reality, as existing apart from the perceiver,
simply cannot be objectively known. Shared realities are
intersubjectively valid, but their objective validity cannot be
known"(Strong,1984: 471). So, the exclusion of values would never
really seem to solve the problem. We would be in a better position to
serve the cause of scientific inquiry if the specific values on which
our theories are founded were explicitly laid out. This renders them
open to criticism by others, instead of allowing them to operate sub
rosa.
V- THE SEARCH FOR ALTERNATIVES
With the narrowness of the positivist/ empiricist perspective in the
social sciences thus effectively exposed, search was diligently on by
many for viable alternatives, by way of reform or of revolution. The
suggestions made however did unfortunately suffer from the self-
inflicted limitations necessitated by the pitch of each author’s initial
critique. So, the most vehement critics of empiricism had to produce
a clearly revolutionary alternative which should have nothing in
common with the culprit in any way! Consequently, their proposals
came out squarely off the mark. The reformists, on the other hand
tended to espouse positions that at least appear to have a balanced
gloss to them . They lost in creativity to the extent that their critique of
the prevailing paradigm was timid and less original. However, we have
to say, that most of the proponents of the new alternatives were still
caught within the historicity of the Nineteenth Century ontology and
epistemology. All of this does not promise to be adequately dealing
with the situation or leading anywhere. Some alternatives apparently
address some neglected gap or another. Some suggest different
approaches to the same aspects. This does not seem to add up to
much.
Giddens tells us that the “orthodox consensus” rooted in “positivistic
or naturalistic philosophies of natural science .. is no more. The
dissolution of the orthodox consensus has been substantially brought
about by the critical attacks which have been mounted against
positivism in philosophy and the social sciences..”. He goes on to say
that “An interest in hermeneutics is one - among various other -
responses to the toppling of the orthodox consensus.. I do want to
claim that, in social theory, a turn to hermeneutics cannot in and of
itself resolve the logical and methodological problems left by the
disappearance of orthodox consensus” (p.p. 1-5). Nazrul Islam
reaches something like the same conclusion with regards to another
possible alternative, that is, phenomenology. He tells us that
“Husserl’s phenomenology is in no way a clear cut method or an
unquestioned philosophy. The questions he raised regarding the
positivist stance are definitely important and need to be answered,
but a simple ‘reversal of the traditional way of proving the existence of
the others via the existence of their material bodies’ as he did is not
enough” (1983: 137-139,145). A parallel to these same statements is
echoed with regard to participatory research by Latapi (1988) who,
although dismissing “..the claim that PR [Participatory Research]
constitutes a new research paradigm for the social sciences..” comes
to conclude that “..some useful lessons should be drawn from [it] for
improving present social research practice” (: 310) .
In psychology and in counseling, we also encounter some clear
parallels to the above evaluations of the situation. In a flurry of
exchanges in the mid-eighties, in the American Psychologist and in
the Journal of Counseling Psychology, a number of distinguished
scholars such as Howard, Patton, and Polkinghorne have taken
positions which were described by some as calling for "a
revolutionary change"(Strong, 1984: 470). Borgen (1984), however,
appears to be only inclined to a reformist stance when he says that "it
is possible to study humans as active agents", a basic dictum of the
new paradigm, “within the traditional view of science”. Dawis (1984)
seems to concur with that view. On the other hand, however, after
considering those same contributions more carefully, Borgen (1984)
concludes that even these seemingly revolutionaries may be rather
looking for integration, and that the perspectives of phenomenology
and hermeneutics may help towards achieving that end. The trouble
with most of these types of discussions is that they, as was
mentioned before, are incapable of rising above the historical/
intellectual baggage of the Western (or rather the European)
science, that resulted from the church-science troubled relations.
Pitrim Sorokin’s towering figure, however, stands alone in a class
by himself in his account of how cultural and historical factors highly
impact, or even create, a science and scientific research in their own
image. On the basis of his vast, meticulous historical/ quantitative
analyses, he has demonstrated that the "value-system" adopted by
any particular culture at any point in its history defines all the
fundamental "compartments" of that culture. One such compartment
is its "systems of truth and knowledge", which includes science and
scientific research (1985: 226-283). To use Kuhn' s terminology, we
may say that a culture' s value system defines the character and
boundaries of the "paradigm" within which normal science is
practiced. Sorokin provided us with a highly coherent description,
diagnosis and prognosis of the "Crisis of Our Age", which should
indeed inform the current post-positivist debate as it applies to social
science research. It also provides us with the long haul historical
context for understanding the developments alluded to earlier on the
origins of the positivist glorification of sense experience as source of
all valid knowledge. But this calls for some more elaboration.
Based on his elaborate historical analysis of social and cultural
dynamics over the last 2500 years, Sorokin concluded that a culture’s
character is determined by its mentality, its value-system rather than
by the social system or the personality system. He isolated three
major types of culture, each with its own value system. These are a)
the Ideational, b) the Sensate, and c) the Idealistic “supersystems of
culture”. To these three supersystems of culture there are three
corresponding “Systems of Truth and Knowledge”. The Ideational
periods are spiritually oriented, where “an infinite, super-sensory, and
super-rational God...is the supreme principle of true reality and value”.
The existence of everything is transient and ultimately inconsequential
except His. “Ideational truth is the truth revealed by the grace of God,
through his mouthpieces (the prophets,, mystics, and founders of
religion), disclosed in a supersensory way through mystic experience,
direct revelation, divine intuition and inspiration. Such a truth may be
called the truth of faith.” The Sensate periods are materially
oriented, where “true reality and values are sensory. Only what we
see, hear, smell, touch, and otherwise perceive through our sense
organs is real and have value. Beyond such a sensory reality either
there is nothing, or , if there is something, we cannot sense it;
therefore it is equivalent to the non-real and the non-existent. As such
it may be neglected”. The Idealistic periods integrate aspects of the
other two. “It is a synthesis of both, made by our reason. In regard to
sensory phenomena, it recognizes the role of the sense organs as
the source and criterion of the validity or invalidity of a proposition. In
regard to supersensory phenomena, it claims that any knowledge of
these is impossible through sensory experience and is obtained only
through the direct revelation of God. Finally, our reason, through logic
and dialectic can derive many valid propositions - for instance, in all
syllogistic and mathematical reasoning.”(1941: 18,67-68)
Where do we stand today in terms of the above mapping?
According to Sorokin, we are "at the end of a brilliant six-hundred-
year-long Sensate day", with all its magnificent scientific and
technological achievements . Sensate culture, sees "true reality" to
be sensory. “Another name for this truth of the senses is empiricism"
(1941: 13,71). ‘Sensate truth, or empiricism... rejects any revealed
super-sensory truth. It discredits also, to a certain extent, reason and
logic as sources of truth until their deductions are corroborated by the
testimony of the sense organs.” (:72). But the Sensate culture has
exhausted its creativity. We are drifting into a phase of a "dying
sensate culture", which is characterized by a combination of Passive
Sensate and Cynical Sensate Mentalities. “And the night of the
transitory period begins with its nightmares...and heart rending
horrors. Beyond it however, the dawn of a new great idealistic culture
is probably waiting to greet men of the future”(:13).
Although some of the above statements are couched in rich
metaphor (vantage Sorokin!) it should be remembered that his
analyses nevertheless are steeped in hard-nosed empirical evidence.
The way out, according to Sorokin on the basis of vast historical/
statistical evidence, is the “correction of the fatal mistakes of the
sensate phase ...with a shift from the agonizing sensate to the
ideational or idealistic or integral.” (:255-6). So, according to Johnston
(1990), “Sorokin’ s solution to this endless cycle [from one
supersystem to another] was the pursuit of Integral truth. This form of
knowing is not identical with any of the three forms of truth, but
embraces all of them. It combines the empirical truth of the senses;
the rational truth of reason; and the super-rational truths of faith”(:101).
It is my contention that Sorokin’s “Integral theory of truth and
reality” do provide us with the most promising epistemological
grounding for an effective answer to the questions posed by the
critique of the positivist/ empiricist tradition. It not only adequately
helps effectively free us from the straitjacket of the positivist/
empiricist tradition, but also allows us to transcend the historical /
political blinders of the church/ science conflict. The Integral Theory
of Truth is favorably compared with the reductionist versions of the
truth as follows: “In this three dimensional aspect of the truth of faith,
of reason, and of the senses, the integral truth is nearer to absolute
truth than any one-sided truth ... The empirico-sensory aspect of it is
given by the truth of the senses; the rational aspect by the truth of
reason; the super-rational aspect by the truth of faith...Each of these
systems of truth separated from the rest becomes less valid or more
fallacious, even within the specific field of its own
competence.”(1957: 691).
We have seen earlier how the new discoveries in neuroscience
are supportive of the basic notion of the legitimacy of the scientific
study of inner experiences - including the spiritual aspects - as
causal factors in determining human behavior. Abraham Maslow in his
work on the “Theory of Metamotivation” asserts that “ The spiritual
life is part of the human essence. It is a defining characteristic without
which human nature is not full human nature… The ‘highest’ values,
the spiritual life .. are.. proper subjects for scientific study and
research..”. However, he goes to great lengths in attempting to prove
- without proof - that the “value life (spiritual, religious, philosophical,
axiological ..etc.) is an aspect of human biology.. It is a kind of ‘higher’
animality”.(1977: 36-40). But that is beside the point. For purposes of
research - its subject matter and its methods - the fact that Maslow,
after decades of diligent work, comes to identify the spiritual
“phenomena” or the empirical manifestations from which it could be
detected is what counts here. Even more significant in this respect is
his denunciation of the “ .. ubiquity of stupidly limited theories of
motivation all over the world.”, something which, ironically, he himself
has more than anyone else contributed to. In any case, this clearly
shows that we seem to be forced to move in the directions
suggested by Sorokin’s work - if we like it or not.
But of course, nobody can read this as a call for scientists to go
mystical! Nothing is farther from the truth. What is implied here is
basically and unequivocally a call for the reinstatement of the spiritual,
non-empirical aspects of the human being as active causal factors,
among the other factors which causally shape human behavior. This
relates to that aspect of reform concerned with the boundaries of the
“subject matter” to be studied by the social sciences. And because
the spiritual factors are supersensory, that is by definition not
accessible to observation through the senses, religious insights
derived from super-rational revealed knowledge had also to be
reinstated as a “source” for plausible hypotheses.
But to translate Sorokin’s formulations into a viable research
paradigm for the social sciences requires a clear delineation of the
way in which the three celebrated sources of knowledge, i.e.,
revelation, reason, and senses, can be integrated into a unified
paradigm for scientific investigation, which should uncompromisingly
live up to the best of the scientific ethos. The traditional model of
science emanating from “the orthodox consensus” had no real
problems when the subject matter of study is strictly empirical/
material. The validity of observations could be vouched for through
the truth of the senses. In the theory building phase, the application
of reason guarantees coherence, but the logical consequences of
whatever was arrived at through reason should once again be
validated through sense experience. But that is as far as the
empiricist, old paradigm goes. The most significant questions that
should be raised now with regards to the new paradigm are the
following:
1) How do we integrate the truth of faith (intuition or revelation) into
this integral, unified “scientific method”?
2) Whose faith or religious tradition?
3) What criteria for assessing the validity of whatever results we may
arrive at? Or is it -once again- a matter of accepting religious
dogma and superimposing it on the facts?!
These are indeed serious questions which have to be addressed in
a very serious manner. Sorokin recognized the difficulties involved in
this regard when he said that “The validity of sensory experience and,
in a less degree, of logical reasoning is pretty well established
nowadays. More doubtful appears intuitional truth.”(1941: 87). But to
him, of course, if the task of integration has been adequately
achieved in the real world, once or rather many times during some of
the more luminous, albeit short-lived, epochs of human history, it
could definitely be done again and again. Which sounds reasonable,
and within our reach if only we are convinced of the validity of that
position and if we were not hampered by the shackles of our own past
professional socialization in “normal science”. The next section will be
devoted to a presentation of the proposed scheme for a translation of
Sorokin’s vision into, hopefully, an integral approach for social
science research. This is, by necessity a very tentative attempt (at a
very ambitious undertaking), which should be seen as such. However,
it is , hopefully, not a simple-minded attempt at a solution that just
glosses over thorny issues. The situation is more serious than that.
What is at stake here is nothing less than a decision as to whether
the social sciences will ever be able to overcome their current
malaise and to be able to really contribute to human well being -- or
whether we will prefer to continue with business as usual , satisfied
with our positions, benefits and prestige .. even while Rome burns to
ashes.
VI- AN INTEGRAL APPROACH TO THEORY BUILDING AND
RESEARCH
The human being, according to the emerging paradigm, is not
only his material being. He combines both the material, observable,
empirical aspects with the spiritual, non-empirical aspects, in an
integrated, indivisible unity which lasts as long as he lives. Human
behavior is the resultant of the dynamic interplay between these two
types of forces. The human being cannot be correctly understood
when reduced to either one of these constituent parts, to the
exclusion of the other ; or when “interaction" between the two
components is ignored. Let's, however, set the "interaction" issue
aside for a moment to focus on the workings of the basic two
elements of the amalgam. We do not expect to face difficulties when
the focus of our study is on the observable, or empirical aspects of
the human being, like studying visual and auditory perception or
effects of certain drugs on behavior in psychology or the study of
spatial distributions of people across regions in demography. After
all, most of our research methods and techniques in the past have
been geared to the investigation of such empirically observable
aspects. Our "senses" do provide the raw material for knowledge,
and “reason" is supposed to enmesh these findings "logically"
together in a coherent fashion to render them “understandable” as a
basis for further potentially fertile exploration .
The big question is, how are we ever to study the other component,
the spiritual, non-empirical aspects of our being. The difficulty here
stems from the fact that soul, or the spiritual aspects are by definition
not amenable to study by reference to sensory experience. This
aspect of human existence is not space- or time- bound. The vehicle
for understanding such phenomena cannot be the sense organs. Nor
could it be studied through reason alone, for reason can only process
what inputs of data - sensory or otherwise - that come its way in
accordance with its innate logical rules. Its speculation beyond that is
mostly groping in the darkness, since it lacks an anchor either in
empirical data or any other source of credible information.
With all of our human faculties thus exhausted, we are left with the
only other source of viable knowledge which can help us understand
those elusive aspects of our own existence. It is here that we come
face to face with the need to consult "revelation", which is supposed -
in the celestial religions at least - to emanate from God and to be
transmitted through his chosen and trustworthy messengers to
humankind. The Supreme Being who created us did withhold from us
any direct means to gain knowledge regarding this innermost, most
valuable component of our being , our soul. But He sent Messengers
to provide human beings with valid insights into this aspect of their
being. The "validity" issue of any specific claims of divine revelation
could be decided upon through scrutiny of evidence as to whether the
alleged Messenger historically existed or not, and whether the
"subject matter" of revelation, i.e. scripture, has managed to reach us
intact or not. But that is a realm for exploration by solemn religious
scholars. Social scientists are more interested in theory-building and
verification or falsification of specific ideas or hypotheses as they go
on the business of attempting to understand the dynamics of
individual and social behavior of the human being. But that is not
meant to detract in any way from the important contribution of
religious scholars to the cause of the ongoing search for the ultimate
truth. Their efforts - if sincere - could indeed help tortured souls find
their way in a troubled world through the guidance of a holistic and
wholesome true belief.
But in the social sciences, our interest is limited to the goals of
understanding, explanation, and prediction. And we are coming to
realize that most probably religious insights could be instrumental in
helping us attain these scientific goals. We do not need, then, to
worry about the thorny issues of historical and substantive scrutiny of
evidence to establish the validity of any particular version of alleged
revelation. Theory-building since Popper gives us a clue as to how
can we utilize such insights into the scientific enterprise. But for this
we need to dwell for a moment on the issue of the pivotal role played
by “theory" in science.
There is general agreement that "the goal of science is to develop
theory" (Turner, 1978:24). As Dawis puts it.. "theory is the end
product of scientific activity, but an end product that is never final
because it is subject to revision and eventual rejection if a better
theory is found (1984:468). Kerlinger (1979) also explains the "high
esteem" held by scientists for theory. He tells us that such esteem
"springs from the basic purpose of science, a